Peer to Peer Privacy Preserving Authenticated Key-exchange
Abstract
In particular Key-exchange algorithm Diffie-Hellman key exchange (DHKE), is one of the most commonly used cryptographic mechanisms for providing network security. In
order to secure Peer to Peer communication here we use a set of protocols password based authenticated key exchange using verifiers to reduce vulnerabilities. Like any other
form of software, P2P applications can contain vulnerabilities. What makes this particularly dangerous for P2P software, however, is that peer-to-peer applications act as servers as well as clients, meaning that they can be more vulnerable to remote exploits. To the best of our knowledge, our protocols are the first provably secure DHKE protocols that additionally enjoy all the following privacy protection advantages:
1) Deniability is concurrent unchangeable statistical zero-knowledge, for both protocol
participants simultaneously;
2) The session transcript and session-key can be generated merely from DH-exponents
(together with some public values), which thus cannot be traced to the pair of protocol
participants; and
3) Exchanged messages do not bear peer’s identity, and do not explicitly bear player role
information
Keywords: Password authenticated key exchange, diffie-hellman, key exchange, security, zero-knowledge, restricted random oracle
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